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Abstract
I examine the evolution of contagion indexes between the European financial sector and the
sovereign sector (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain) during
the European sovereign credit crisis. Contagion indexes, ∆CoV aR and ∆CoES, reflect
events associated with extreme left tail returns and interdependencies between defaults dif-
ferent than those observed in tranquil times. These measures reveal very useful information
concerning risk management. I use a copula approach with time-varying parameters to
capture changes in the tail dependence between returns in the financial and the sovereign
sectors. I employ a Switching Markov model to identify the most stressful moments of the
contagion indicators. The results point out the emergence of Greek debt crisis on March
2010 and the vulnerable situation of Spain and Italy in summer 2011 as the main periods
where the contagion from the sovereign to the financial sector was stronger. The decrease in
contagion was gradual since the speech made by the ECB on July 26th, 2012. The statistical
significance of the change in the contagion indicators is checked using boostrap tests.
Keywords: CoV aR, Copula, European sovereign credit crisis, systemic risk
JEL: G18, G21, G32, G38
1. Introduction
Systemic risk in biological terms is defined as a possible global disaster arising from the
behaviour of a single individual of the species that coexist in the same environment. Like-
wise in Economics, systemic risk is the threat of a system breakdown because the effects
of the interactions among individuals are undervalued, i.e. negative externalities arise from
the relationship between economic agents. Besides, since systemic risk affects by nature all
sectors, it should be evaluated not only within sectors, but also between sectors. The timely
identification of spillovers between the financial and the sovereign sectors is a crucial topic for
preventing scenarios such as the European sovereign credit crisis. Government guarantees
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Email address: jojea@ucm.es (Javier Ojea Ferreiro )
1
and bailouts have helped to build a close relationship between the financial and sovereign
sectors, ultimately triggering massive damages to the welfare state as well as political re-
actions in the form of populist movements along Europe. Sovereign debt positions held by
banks in their portfolios and the link between the ratings of the financial and the sovereign
sectors worked as transmission channels for risk from the sovereign to the financial sector.
This two-way feedback, as named by Acharya et al. (2014), can become an adverse feedback
loop between sectors in case of crisis. While such relationship was extensively studied during
the European sovereign credit crisis (Albertazzi et al. 2014, Panetta et al. 2011, Acharya
et al. 2014, Gray et al. 2007, Gerlach et al. 2010, Ejsing and Lemke 2011, Dieckmann and
Plank 2011), how this loop has been weakened has not been so widely studied. This article
studies how the credit risk contagion between these sectors has evolved during the period
2009− 2016.
To shed light on this matter we have to clarify first what is understood by contagion. There
is not an unique criterion to identify a contagion event. Contagion is a sophisticated and
multidimensional concept that has several features. The focus on a certain set of conta-
gion characteristic will lead to a different methodology for building the contagion indicator.
For instance, defining contagion as the spread of idiosyncratic negative shocks to other in-
stitutions may lead to a Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework. Indeed, most research
on this topic has been conducted in a VAR framework (Alter and Beyer (2012), Bicu and
Candelon (2012), Kok and Gross (2013), Alter and Schu¨ler (2012), Chudik and Fratzscher
(2012), Candelon et al. (2011)). Following the VAR methodology, impulse response functions
and variance decomposition are employed to evaluate contagion through the effects of an id-
iosyncratic shock on the other economic agents. The contagion measure under this approach
expresses mean effects, but a measure based on the left tail returns would be more useful
for risk management proposes. Moreover, not all the dependence between the sovereign and
the financial sectors should be considered contagion. They are not independent sectors and
a certain level of connection may be advantageous. These two points, i.e. the behaviour in
an adverse scenario and the interdependencies between sectors different than those observed
in normal times, are the key features that lead in this paper to a different proposal of conta-
gion measure. Certainly, the proposed contagion indicators have implications for investors,
who need a risk management tool to assess the exposure of their sectoral portfolios from
undesired links with other sectors which are not taken into account by unconditional risk
measures such as Value-at-Risk (V aR) and Expected Shortfall (ES). Looking at the change
in the conditional risk measures (CoV aR and CoES) when the conditioning sector moves
from normal times to a distress scenario gives essential information concerning the capital
shortfall in the conditioned institution due to the existence of dependence between sectors
i.e. ∆CoV aR and ∆CoES. I employ ∆CoV aR and ∆CoES as indicators of credit risk
contagion between the sovereign sector on a country level and the European financial sector
as a whole. The financial sector is measured on an European level due to the cross positions
of sovereign debt by European financial institutions and also because of the high level of
integration in the Eurozone financial sector.
The methodological approach for building ∆CoV aR and ∆CoES should be flexible in or-
der to characterize accurately marginal features such as heteroskedasticity, leverage effects,
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asymmetry and skewness, apart from considering different possible joint distributions and
changes in dependence. A copula methodology where the copula parameter is time-varying
combined with a suitable marginal model meets these criteria. This methodology is em-
ployed not only because of its straightforward decomposition of the joint distribution, but
also due to computational reasons, being less time expensive than other approaches that
imply numerical integration such as the GARCH proposal by Girardi and Ergu¨n (2013).
Once the contagion risk indicators have been built, I identify regimes for the level of conta-
gion risk based on a Switching Markov model. In particular, the Switching Markov model
points out that for most sovereign sectors the contagion to the financial sector was concen-
trated in two periods, a first one around March 2010, when the Greek debt crisis emerged
and a second one in the summer of 2011 due to the confidence crisis that Spanish and Ital-
ian sovereign sectors were raised. Besides, the contagion from the financial sector to the
sovereign sector seems to end later and more slowly than the contagion from the sovereign
sector to the financial sector. Considering Draghi’s speech on July 26th, 2012 as a breakpoint
in the European credit crisis, I test a possible change in the distribution and in the mean
of the contagion measures orthogonalized by its own past using a boostraping procedure.
Results show a decrease in the mean level of contagion after the ECB’s speech and a smaller
downside spillover between sectors after the breakpoint compared to the period before July
26th, 2012.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the framework
where the contagion risk measures are applied. Section 3 suggests the copula approach for
assessing ∆CoV aR and ∆CoES, describing the different dependence structures considered
in the paper. Section 4 presents the data employed for the empirical application. Section
5 shows the main results and robustness checks. Section 6 closes describing possible future
research lines and some policy recommendations, pointing out ∆CoV aR and ∆CoES as
suitable tools for assessing contagion from a risk management point of view.
2. Background
CoV aR measure was introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) as a systemic risk
measure for identifying Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). The aim was
to express the minimum returns for the conditioned institution y with some confidence level
(1−β)100% given a quantile α of the returns distribution for conditioning institution x, i.e.,
Pt−1[ry,t ≤ CoV aRy|x,t(α, β)|rx,t = V aRx,t(α)] = β. (1)
Girardi and Ergu¨n (2013) enhances CoV aR definition to allow backtesting and improve
the behaviour of CoV aR as a function of the dependence between institutions (Mainik and
Schaanning (2014), Zhang (2015)). The modified CoV aR definition expresses the minimum
returns for the conditioned institution y with some confidence level (1− β)100% given that
the conditioning institution x is below its α100% worst case scenario, i.e.
Pt−1[ry,t ≤ CoV aRy|x,t(α, β)|rx,t ≤ V aRx,t(α)] = β. (2)
3
I employ the subscript f for representing the global European financial sector and s for the
European sovereign sectors. The level α of the conditioning event is usually fixed at α = β
where α, β ∈ (0, 1), and due to the focus on the left tail returns, α and β are close to zero
in a distress scenario. Employing a conditioning event as the V aR, which is independent of
the level of risk of the conditioning institution x, allows us to compare CoV aR given several
conditioning institutions with different risk profiles.
Even though the CoV aR properties improve under Equation (2), it still has some limi-
tations since it looks only to a certain percentile of the conditioned institution y and con-
sequently it is not subadditive. This feature can be enhanced if the Value-at-Risk dimen-
sion is moved to an Expected Shortfall framework. The Conditional Expected Shortfall,
CoESy|x,t(α, β), measures the average return for institution y when the returns are lower
than CoV aRy|x,t(α, β), i.e.
CoESy|x,t(α, β) =
1
β
∫ β
0
CoV aRy|x,t(α, q)dq, (3)
where CoV aRy|x,t(α, q) is given by Equation (2).
Losses not considered in normal scenarios can trigger out a systemic event because of
lack of liquidity, i.e. in a normal scenario capital needs can be fulfilled without spillover
effect between sectors, but in a distress scenario capital needs could lead to bankrupt and
bailout processes, triggering out a contagion event between the sovereign and the financial
sectors. Therefore, CoV aR and CoES are unsatisfactory measures for assessing the conta-
gion between sectors. Indeed, they may be enough to capture the losses in a given scenario
but not the loss changes when the conditioning scenario moves. The change in the previous
conditional risk measures when the conditioning variable moves from tranquil times to a dis-
tress period are known as Delta Conditional measures, i.e. ∆CoV aR and ∆CoES. There is
no consensus about the definition of tranquil times under ∆CoV aR. Chen and Khashanah
(2014) employs the unconditional V aR measure and Girardi and Ergu¨n (2013) uses a stan-
dard deviation range around the mean value of the conditioning variable. However, the
former definition responds to the importance of taking into account the conditioning vari-
able for risk assessment proposed but it does not capture the relevance of a change in the
conditioning variable from a normal period to a distress scenario for the conditioned vari-
able. On the other hand, the latter definition for normal scenario is not fully defined for
non-Gaussian marginal distributions due to the need to use higher moments, e.g. skewness
and kurtosis. In this article, the normal scenario is defined as a β/2 range of quantiles
around the median. Consequently, I define ∆CoV aRy|x,t(β) as
∆CoV aRy|x,t(β) = CoV aRy|x,t(αs, β)− CoV aRy|x,t(αn, β), (4)
where αs = β in Equation (2) , i.e.
Pt−1[ry,t ≤ CoV aRy|x,t(αs, β)|rx,t ≤ V aRx,t(β)] = β
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and αn are the set of quantiles between the lower percentile α
− and the upper percentile α+
such that
Pt−1[ry,t ≤ CoV aRy|x,t(αn, β)|V aRx,t(α−) ≤ rx,t ≤ V aRx,t(α+)] = β,
where α+ = 0.5 + β/2 and α− = 0.5 − β/2. The idea of considering an upper and a
lower bound for the conditioning variable was already considered by Reboredo and Ugolini
(2016). The proposed definition for a normal scenario is as accurate as the one for the
distress scenario, because we are considering the same β range of quantiles, and it is
fully defined in percentile terms. These features were not fulfilled by previous definitions.
∆CoV aRy|x,t(β) expresses the undervaluation of the minimum returns measure with a con-
fidence level (1−β)100% for institution y when institution x moves from normal times to an
adverse scenario. ∆CoES can be computed following the same procedure as in Equation (4).
Delta Conditional measures do not distinguish whether the increase in the risk measure is
due to causal reasons or to a common factor between both institutions. Hence, I will capture
changes in the conditioned institution even in the absence of a direct link. Imagine that the
financial sector f has a diversified sovereign debt portofolio where an isolated bankrupt in
one country s would not cause contagion to the financial system. However, Delta Conditional
measures would disclose contagion if the distress is due to a common factor of the set of
countries. Although ∆CoV aR and ∆CoES do not express causality, they are directional
measures, i.e. ∆CoV aRf |s,t 6= ∆CoV aRs|f,t.
3. Methodology
The model structure for CoV aR can be divided into three steps: the marginal model
structure that gathers individual features as heterokedasticity or kurtosis, the copula func-
tion that links marginal density functions and the copula time-varying parameter that allows
changes in tail dependence. The assessment of CoV aR is straightforward given these three
stages.
Following Bayes’ theorem and copula theory Equation (2) can be rewritten as a ratio of
probabilities, i.e.
Pt−1[ry,t ≤ CoV aRy|x,t(α, β)|rx,t ≤ V aRx,t(α)] =
C(uy, α; θt)
α
= β,
where θt is the copula parameter at time t, Pt−1[ry,t ≤ CoV aRy|x,t(α, β), rx,t ≤ V aRx,t(α)] =
C(uy, α; θt) and Pt−1[rx,t ≤ V aRx,t(α)] = α.
Therefore CoV aRy|x,t(α, β) is obtained by identifying the value u∗y such that C(u
∗
y, α) = αβ
and then employing the inverse cumulative distribution function of institution y’s returns,
i.e. F−1ry,t(uy∗) = CoV aRy|x,t(α, β).
In this section, first I describe the marginal model and the assumption distribution about
the innovation, then I present a set of copulas considered to model the joint distribution
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between the financial and the sovereign sector and finally I establish the dynamic evolution
in the copula parameter to allow time-varying dependence between sectors.
3.1. Marginal model
For each sector, I estimate a P-order autoregressive model (AR(P )) where the lag P , for
parsimony reasons, is the minimum such that the innovation has no autocorrelation. I also
model heterokedasticity and leverage effect by using a GJR-GARCH(1,1) representation.
Finally I model skewness and kurtosis by assuming a Hansen (1994)’s skewed t distribution
for the innovations. That is,
rj,t = φj,0 +
P∑
k=1
φj,1rj,t−k︸ ︷︷ ︸
µj,t
+εj,t, j = f, s (5)
with εj,t = σj,tξj,t where E (εj,tεj,t−k) = 0 for ∀k > 0 and σ2j,t is the conditional variance
given by a GJR-GARCH(1,1) specification, i.e.
σ2j,t = ωi + αj(1 + θj1j,t−1)ε
2
j,t + βjσ
2
j,t−1, (6)
where the indicator function 1j,t−1 values 1 if j,t < 0 and zero otherwise and ξj,t ∼
f(ξj,t; ηj, λj) where f is the probability distribution function of the skewed-t distribution, ηj
denotes the number of degrees of freedom and λj the asymmetry parameter.
The density of Hansen (1994)’s skewed-t distribution is
h(ξt|η, λ) =
{
bc(1 + 1
η−2(
bξt+a
1−λ )
2)−(η+1)/2 ξt < −a/b
bc(1 + 1
η−2(
bξt+a
1+λ
)2)−(η+1)/2 ξt ≥ −a/b
, (7)
where 2 < η <∞ and −1 < λ < 1. The constants a, b and c are given by
a = 4cλ
(
η − 2
η − 1
)
, b =
√
1 + 3λ2 − a2, c = Γ(
η+1
2
)√
pi(η − 2)Γ(η
2
)
.
Note that when λ = 0 Equation (7) reduces to the standard Gaussian distribution as η →∞.
When λ = 0 and η finite, we obtain the standardized symmetric-t distribution.
3.2. Copula function
The choice of copula determines the relationship between a couple of marginal distri-
butions. An inaccurate copula choice would suppose missleading CoV aR and ∆CoV aR
estimates and ultimately a wrong interpretation of their values. To diminish that chance I
compare a broad range of copula choices using Akaike Information Criterion (AICC) cor-
rected for small sample bias as suggested by Hurvich and Tsai (1989). AICC criterion has
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been employed for copula selection in other CoV aR studies such as Reboredo and Ugolini
(2015b). I consider 8 alternative copulas that are broadly employed in financial studies.
Each copula implies a different tail dependence. The Clayton and the Survival Gumbel
copulas allow for lower tail dependence but no upper tail dependence, whereas the oppo-
site situation is found in Gumbel copula. The Joe-Clayton (BB7), the Student t and the
Clayton-Gumbel (BB1) copulas allow for either upper and lower tail dependence. Table D.1
presents the main tail dependence features in the set of employed copulas.
[Insert Table D.1 here]
3.3. Time evolution in the copula parameter
I assume that the functional form of the copula remains fixed over the sample while the
parameters for each copula are varying based on some equation for the time evolution. A
time-varying copula parameter allows changes in tail dependence along time. As a result,
the model is more flexible for tracking changes in the relationship between both sectors.
I employ the approach proposed by Patton (2006). Alternative approaches for modeling
time-varying copula parameter may be using rolling-windows (Aloui et al. (2013)), General-
ized Autoregressive Score (GAS) (Creal et al. (2013)) or Stochastic Autoregressive copulas
(SCAR) (Hafner and Manner (2012)). Another way to have a change in tail dependence
over time is to assume different states, each of one characterized by a certain copula, a
regimen-switching copulas like Rodr´ıguez (2007). A comparative analysis of them is out of
the scope of this work.
The parametric representation for the Clayton, the Gumbel and the Survival Gumbel
copulas is
θt = Λ1
(
ω + βθt−1 + α
1
20
20∑
k=1
|us,t−k − uf,t−k|
)
, (8)
where Λ1 is exp(x) for the Clayton copula and (exp(x) + 1) for the Gumbel and Survival
Gumbel copula to keep the values in the feasible region of the parameter space. The evolution
for the parameter δ of Frank copula is represented by
δt = ω + βδt−1 + α
1
20
20∑
k=1
|us,t−k − uf,t−k|. (9)
The evolution equation for the two parameter families of non-elliptical copulas , i.e. BB1
and BB7 copulas, is based on the link between these parameters and the tail dependence,
which is disclosed in Table D.1.
τKt = Λ2
(
ωK + βKτ
K
t−1 + αK
1
20
20∑
k=1
|us,t−k − uf,t−k|
)
, K = U,L (10)
where Λ2(x) ≡ (1 + exp(−x))−1 is the logistic transformation to keep the tail dependence
coefficient between 0 and 1.
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For the Student t copula I assume that the number of degrees of freedom is constant (Elliott
and Timmermann, 2013, p. 932 , Reboredo and Ugolini, 2016) and only the correlation
parameter, i.e., ρt, is time-varying. The dynamics for the parameter of elliptical copulas is
ρt = Λ3
(
ω + βρt−1 + α
1
20
20∑
k=1
Φ−1(us,t−k)Φ−1(uf,t−k)
)
,
where Φ−1 is either the inverse Gaussian cumulative distribution function in case the elliptical
copula is Gaussian or the inverse Student t cumulative distribution function with η degrees
of freedom for the Student t copula. The modified logistic transformation allows for a value
of ρt ∈ (−1, 1), i.e. Λ3(x) ≡ 1−exp(−x)1+exp(−x) .
Table D.2 provides a summary of the time-varying parameters representation proposed for
each copula.
[Insert Table D.2 here]
The joint density function is obtained by combining the marginal probability distribution
functions and the density copula function. I employ the two-step method of Inference Func-
tions for Margins (IFM) to estimate the parameters by maximum log-likelihood, where
marginal distributions and copulas are estimated separately. The computational cost of
finding the optimal set of parameters is significantly reduced significantly by this approach.
Joe and Xu (1996) shows that the estimated parameters using IFM method are consistent
and asymptotically normal.
4. Data
It is widely accepted that the European sovereign debt crisis was led by a confidence
crisis in the institutions. Consequently I employ a credit derivative, credit default swaps
(CDS), obtained from Datastream on weekly basis from May 22th, 2009 to May 13th, 2016
to compute CoV aR measure. The total number of observations is 338.
I use the 5-year contract because it is the most liquid maturity. Concerning the restructuring
event, I choose complete restructuring, also known as old reestructuring because its credit
event is used mainly in Europe and it is the usual one for sovereign institutions (Anson
et al., 2004, p. 62). Moreover, the CDS employed in this study are those with a senior debt
underlying since it is the most traded branch of the CDS categories. I choose the same type,
seniority and maturity for the financial firms’ CDS.
I consider sovereign CDS from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and
Spain. A total of 25 European bank CDS meet the criteria for the considered period, 14
being banks from the core European area whereas 11 are in the periphery. The number of
banks and their countries are: Austria (2), Belgium (1), Finland (1), France (5), Germany
(5), Italy (4), Netherland(3), Portugal (1) and Spain (3).
[Insert Table D.3 here]
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I build financial CDS indices for each country by taking the median CDS spread in a
given country each week. Later, I transform them into returns and I obtain the common
financial risk factor among CDS spread using principal component analysis1. According to
Rodr´ıguez-Moreno and Pen˜a (2013), the first principal component of a CDS portfolio is the
best systemic measure in the macro group. Table D.4 shows the weight under the principal
component analysis. To check for robustness, the equally weighted financial portfolio is also
built with similar results.
[Insert Table D.4 here]
CDS spreads are transformed in returns following Berndt and Obreja (2010) and Ballester
et al. (2016).
ri,t = −∆CDStAt(T )
= −∆CDSt1
4
4T∑
j=1
δ
(
t,
j
4
)
q
(
t,
j
4
)
, (11)
where ∆CDSt(T ) is the weekly change in CDS spreads with maturity T and At(T ) is the
value of a defaultable quarterly annuity over the next T years. T is equal to five years, given
the selected CDS data. The risk-free discount factor for day t and s quarter is δ(t, s), fitted
from Euribor rates2. The risk-neutral survival probability of the bank or government over the
next s quarters can be written as q(t, s) = exp(−λt(s)) where λt is the risk-neutral default
intensity. λt is computed directly from observed CDS spreads as λt = 4 log(1 + CDSt/4L).
L denotes the risk neutral expected loss given default (LGD), fixed at 60% for corporate
firms and 40% for governments. Note that the change in CDS spreads is used for returns
estimation preceded by a minus sign, so an increase in credit risk, i.e. a raise in CDS spreads,
supposes a decrease in CDS returns whereas a reduction of credit risk implies an increase
in CDS returns. Figure C.1 shows the path of the CDS quote in basic points (green line)
and the price employing an exponential function on the returns obtained from Equation
(11) (blue line). Prices seems to react to the same shocks as CDS, although in opposite
directions. The black line indicates the week of July 26th, 2012 when Mario Draghi made a
speech that, as can be seen in the Figure, changed the trend for Spanish and Italian CDS
quotes.
[Insert Figure C.1 here]
Table D.5 provides descriptive statistics for the CDS returns of the financial sector and
the European countries. The excess kurtosis and the skewness in the data support the choice
1In order to avoid giving an excessive weight to the most volatile country-level CDS returns, the PCA
is performed on the correlation matrix. This approach is similar to the one employed by Chamizo and
Novales Cinca (2016) for obtaining the returns of the financial system credit risk.
2Euribor rates are obtained from the European Money Markets Institute (EMMI) and floored at 0%.
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of the skewed t distribution for innovations. Annual volatility is around 45 − 50%, in line
with volatility in the stock market. Furthermore, CDS returns from the financial sector have
lower volatility than sovereign CDS returns and also the lowest mean return.
[Insert Table D.5 here]
5. Results
I discuss the results for contagion between the financial and the sovereign sector by
presenting first the results of the marginal distribution from which I obtain the inputs for
the copula and from which I assess the quantile for the conditioning variable. Later I discuss
the results for the copula estimations and copula choice, from which I assess the conditional
quantile. Finally I discuss the Delta Conditional measures (∆CoV aR and ∆CoES), finding
stress periods for these indicators using a Switching Markov process. I employ boostrap
tests to check for a possible change in the distribution.
5.1. Results for the marginal models
Table D.6 shows the estimated parameters with the z-statistics in brackets. A first
order autoregressive model is employed for all the sectors excepted for Spanish and Italian
sovereign CDS returns. For these countries a second order autoregressive model is employed
considering the autocorrelation analysis and the backtesting performance. Unconditional
coverage backtesting test proposed by Kupiec (1995) and the conditional one proposed by
Christoffersen (1998) are used for testing the number of exceedances of a V aR with a 5%
significance level. All the models pass the tests as show by their p-values, i.e., we do not
reject neither that the probability of having an exceedance is a 5% nor that those exceedances
are independent from each other. P-values for Ljung-Box and Engle’s ARCH tests show that
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are corrected gathered in the model.
[Insert Table D.6 here]
5.2. Results for the copula model
I estimate different types of copulas (see Table D.1) using the skewed-t cumulative dis-
tribution function of the standardized residuals for each of the marginal models. Table D.7
and D.8 summarize the estimated parameters and the standard deviation between brackets.
[Insert Table D.7 here]
[Insert Table D.8 here]
The interpretation of those values is harder than in a GARCH model due to the trans-
formation needed to keep the time-varying parameter in a region of the parameter space.
However, the time-varying evolution of the copula parameter is plotted for the selected copu-
las according to the AICC criterion. Figure C.2 shows the time-series evolution of the copula
parameter between the financial sector and each one of the sovereign sectors. Austria clearly
presents a peak in dependence after May 2012, whereas the sovereign sectors of France and
Belgium reduce significantly their dependence parameter with the financial sector at the end
of the sample.
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[Insert Table D.9 here]
[Insert Figure C.2 here]
The copula selection according to AICC criterion (see Table D.9) could lead to choose
a copula that fits really well the higher tail of the joint distribution but not so well for
lower quantiles. To double check the chosen copulas, Table D.10 presents backtesting re-
sults for the frequency of the exceedances below the 5% quantile of returns in conditioned
institution y when there are exceedances below the ex-ante V aRx(0.5) of the conditioning.
This corresponds to CoV aRy|x,t(0.5, 0.05) in Equation (2). Table D.10 shows the p-values
of the CoV aR for the unconditional coverage test proposed by Kupiec (1995). Besides the
p-values, the upper and lower bound of the non-rejection area with 5% significance level
is presented jointly with the number of exceedances of the conditioned variable, i.e. the
exceedance bounds out of which we could reject the null hypothesis with a 95% confidence
level. The number of exceedances for the conditioning variable is also shown in Table D.10.
Table D.10 shows the p-values for the conditional coverage test proposed by Christoffersen
(1998) to detect possible clusters in the exceedances of the conditioned variable.
Both backtesting tests, i.e. unconditioned and conditioned, are passed with a 5% signifi-
cance level in both directions, i.e. CoV aRs|f,t(0.5, 0.05) and CoV aRf |s,t(0.5, 0.05). Further
information about how these tests are built can be found in Appendix A.
[Insert Table D.10 here]
5.3. Contagion indicator results
Figures C.3 and C.4 present weekly returns for the sovereign sector and the financial
sector (in the blue lines), the Value-at-Risk assessed with a 95% confidence level (in the
black lines), and the minuend and subtrahend from which is built the ∆CoV aRy|x(β), i.e.
the V aR for the conditioned institution when the conditioning institution is in normal times
or CoV aRy,x,t(αn, β) (in the magenta lines) and the V aR for the conditioned institution
when the conditioning institution is in distress or CoV aRy,x,t(αs, β) (in the red lines). All
the risk measures are computed with a 95% confidence level, i.e., β = 0.05.
[Insert Figure C.3 here]
[Insert Figure C.4 here]
I employ a Switching Markov model which endogenously identifies periods of extreme
contagion for ∆CoV aR measures. The assumption that time series properties of ∆CoV aR,
e.g. mean and variance, are state-dependent where the transition between states occurs
stochastically allows us to distinguish periods of high contagion from periods of moderate
contagion. In other words, the cumulative distribution function for each ∆CoV aR measure
is approximated using a mixture of normal distributions where probabilities are given by a
first order Markov Chain. The number of states assumed may be two or three because of the
economical interpretation of low, medium or high contagion regime. The number of states
and the changes in parameters, i.e. changes in the mean parameter or also in the variance
parameter, are chosen according to the values of AICC and Regimen Classification Measure
11
(RCM) like Hollo et al. (2012). I choose the regime with the lowest mean ∆CoV aR as the
distress period. Figures C.5 and C.6 show these periods of crises shaded for the contagion
measures ∆CoV aR and ∆CoES. Figures C.5 and C.6 show that are two main periods of
stress, one around March 2010 when the Greek debt crisis arose and a second one around
August 2011 when the ECB had to bought Italian and Spanish debt using the Securities
Market Program. Black line represents July 26th, 2012 when Mario Draghi made the speech
when he said that the ECB would do whatever it takes to preserve the Euro3. Note that
distress periods after that date are less frequent and with a lower length than before, but
according to the Switching Markov approach the contagion periods did not stop suddenly
then for most of the countries. Moreover, the high contagion period from the sovereign
sector to the financial sector seems to end before than vice versa.
[Insert Figure C.5 here]
[Insert Figure C.6 here]
I perform some boostrap tests to double check the change in the contagion risk indicators
since July 26th, 2012. First, I delete autocorrelation in the ∆CoV aR time-series by orthog-
onalize it from previous month values, so the new time series can not be explained by the
past trend of the indicator. The fact of estimate the parameters of ∆CoV aR introduces a
nuisance parameter that invalidates the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for equal distribu-
tion of the time-series before and after the breakpoint. Certainty, this nuisance parameter
affects to the free-distribution of the KS test (Durbin, J. (1973)). Abadie (2002) proposes
a boostrap KS test to deal with this problem. Bernal et al. (2014) and Reboredo and
Ugolini (2015a) along others use this test in the CoV aR framework. I employ the boostrap
procedure for building also a mean test, obtaining the critical values through the boostrap
method. Appendix B explains in detail the procedure for building these tests.
The null hypothesis of mean before July 26th, 2012 is lower or equal than after in absolute
value is rejected at a 5% significance level for most contagion indexes. There is enough
statistical evidence against the null hypothesis that the mean contagion levels between the
financial and the sovereign sectors before July 26th, 2012 are lower or equal than after this
breakpoint.
6. Conclusions
I have examined how contagion indexes between the European financial sector and
sovereign sector in a country level (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Spain) evolved during the European sovereign credit crisis, before and after the breakpoint
stated by the ECB’s speech on July 26th, 2012. In this article CoV aR measure is employed
with a copula methodology to assess the interrelationship between sovereign and financial
credit risk. The economic literature has not employed yet this approach to deal with the
spillovers between sovereign and financial credit risk. This approach is a robust way of
3This date was chosen ad hoc due to the impact in the CDS quotes and in the stock markets
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measuring systemic risk focusing on a low quantile of the returns’ distribution.
The copula methodology allows us to decompose the joint distribution in an understand-
able way, besides of being a time-saving and less computationally expensive method than
other procedures. The time-varying representation of the copula parameter allows for a flex-
ible adaptation to the sample, capturing changes in tail dependence and contagion levels.
Indeed, the copula parameter plays a key role weighting the level of stress for each assets,
as measured by its volatility, by its dependence with the other sector. Future studies might
try to find out how different dynamics for the time evolution of the copula parameter might
affect to the numerical values of ∆CoV aR and ∆CoES. These methodological improve-
ments in the model could increase model risk due to the high adaptability of the model.
The possibility of more flexibility could mean a noisy estimation.
Using weekly CDS returns from May 2009 to May 2016, a switching Markov model es-
timated for ∆CoV aR indicates two main periods of contagion between both sectors. The
first period would be related to the surge of Greek problems on March 2010 while the sec-
ond period in summer 2011 might be due to the doubts concerning Spain and Italy. The
contagion from sovereign to financial crisis seems to almost finish after the ECB’s speech on
July 26th, 2012 . On the other hand, contagion from the financial to the sovereign sector
seems to decrease more slowly. Several boostrap tests are computed to check if there was a
change in contagion after this breakpoint. Results show a change in the level and range of
values taken by ∆CoV aR.
Policy makers need indicators for assessing the effectiveness and the collateral detrimental
effects that some policy measures can have on the economy. The contagion indicators built
using CoV aR methodology have implications for investors, who need a risk management
tool to assess the exposure of their sectoral portfolios from undesired links with other sectors
which are not taken into by unconditional risk measures. For instance, this measure provides
information with a certain confidence level on how much could increase the maximum loss
from a sovereign debt portfolio if a financial crisis occurs. ∆CoV aR and ∆CoES provide
support as tools for the measurement of contagion and spillover effects. Our findings reveal
them as suitable tools to provide reliable information for taking effective and efficient policy
measures.
Acknowledgement
Parts of this work were completed while visiting the JRC (Joint Research Centre) of the
European Commission in Ispra (Italy). This article was presented at the Finance & Economy
Unit’s internal seminar in the JRC of the European Commission on August 29th, 2017. I am
indebted to the JRC staff in Ispra for their helpful comments and hospitality. In particular,
I want to mention Elisa Ossola, Eduardo Rossi, Dimitrios Exadaktylos and Marco Pinchetti.
I thank to my PhD supervisor, Prof. Alfonso Novales Cinca, and the Research Institute of
Economic Analysis (ICAE) for the support in the production of this article. This article was
13
also presented at the ICAE’s internal seminar in the Complutense University of Madrid on
December 13th, 2017. I really appreciate useful advises and comments during this seminar.
I thank Massimiliano Caporin and Juan Carlos Reboredo for providing valuable suggestions
that have improved the quality of this paper. I acknowledge financial support provided by
the Spanish Ministry of Education under grant FPU15/04241.
7. References
Abadie, A., 2002. Bootstrap tests for distributional treatment effects in instrumental variable models. Journal
of the American Statistical Association 97 (457), 284–292.
Acharya, V., Drechsler, I., Schnabl, P., 2014. A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk.
Journal of Finance 69 (6), 2689–2739.
Adrian, T., Brunnermeier, M. K., 2016. CoVaR. American Economic Review 106 (7), 1705–41.
Albertazzi, U., Ropele, T., Sene, G., Signoretti, F. M., 2014. The impact of the sovereign debt crisis on the
activity of Italian banks. Journal of Banking & Finance 46, 387–402.
Aloui, R., Hammoudeh, S., Nguyen, D. K., 2013. A time-varying copula approach to oil and stock market
dependence: The case of transition economies. Energy Economics 39, 208–221.
Alter, A., Beyer, A., 2012. The dynamics of spillover effects during the European sovereign debt turmoil.
CFS Working Paper Series 2012/13, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
Alter, A., Schu¨ler, Y. S., 2012. Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the
financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (12), 3444–3468.
Anson, M. J., Fabozzi, F. J., Choudhry, M., Chen, R.-R., 2004. Credit Derivatives: Instruments, Applica-
tions, and Pricing. Vol. 133. John Wiley & Sons.
Ao, S.-I., Kim, H. K., Amouzegar, M. A., 2017. Transactions on Engineering Technologies: World Congress
on Engineering and Computer Science 2015. Springer.
Ballester, L., Casu, B., Gonza´lez-Urteaga, A., 2016. Bank fragility and contagion: Evidence from the bank
CDS market. Journal of Empirical Finance 38, 394–416.
Bernal, O., Gnabo, J.-Y., Guilmin, G., 2014. Assessing the contribution of banks, insurance and other
financial services to systemic risk. Journal of Banking & Finance 47, 270–287.
Berndt, A., Obreja, I., 2010. Decomposing European CDS returns. Review of Finance 14 (2), 189–233.
Bicu, A., Candelon, B., 2012. On the importance of indirect banking vulnerabilities in the Eurozone. Research
Memorandum 033, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and
Organization (METEOR).
Candelon, B., Sy, A., Arezki, R., 2011. Sovereign Rating News and Financial Markets Spillovers; Evidence
from the European Debt Crisis. Tech. rep., International Monetary Fund.
Chamizo, A., Novales Cinca, A., 2016. Looking Through Systemic Risk: Determinants, Stress Testing and
Market Value. Journal of Financial Transformation 43, 117–123.
Chen, K.-H., Khashanah, K., 2014. Measuring Systemic Risk: Vine Copula GARCH Model . Tech. rep.,
World Congress on Engineering and Computer Science 2015.
Christoffersen, P., 1998. Evaluating interval forecasts. International Economic Review, 841–862.
Chudik, A., Fratzscher, M., 2012. Liquidity, risk and the global transmission of the 2007-08 financial crisis
and the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis. Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 107.
Creal, D., Koopman, S. J., Lucas, A., 2013. Generalized autoregressive score models with applications.
Journal of Applied Econometrics 28 (5), 777–795.
Dieckmann, S., Plank, T., 2011. Default risk of advanced economies: An empirical analysis of Credit Default
Swaps during the financial crisis. Review of Finance 16 (4), 903–934.
Durbin, J., 1973. Distribution theory for tests based on the sample distribution function. SIAM.
Ejsing, J., Lemke, W., January 2011. The Janus-headed salvation: Sovereign and bank credit risk premia
during 2008-2009. Economics Letters 110 (1), 28–31.
Elliott, G., Timmermann, A., 2013. Handbook of economic forecasting. Elsevier.
14
Gerlach, S., Schulz, A., Wolff, G. B., 2010. Banking and Sovereign risk in the Euro area. Discussion Paper
Series 1: Economic Studies 2010,09, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
Girardi, G., Ergu¨n, A. T., 2013. Systemic risk measurement: Multivariate GARCH estimation of CoVaR.
Journal of Banking and Finance 37 (8), 3169–3180.
Gray, D. F., Merton, R. C., Bodie, Z., Nov. 2007. New Framework for Measuring and Managing Macrofinan-
cial Risk and Financial Stability. NBER Working Papers 13607, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hafner, C. M., Manner, H., March 2012. Dynamic stochastic copula models: estimation, inference and
applications. Journal of Applied Econometrics 27 (2), 269–295.
Hansen, B. E., 1994. Autoregressive conditional density estimation. International Economic Review, 705–
730.
Hollo, D., Kremer, M., Lo Duca, M., Mar. 2012. CISS - a Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress in the
financial system. Working Paper Series 1426, European Central Bank.
Hurvich, C. M., Tsai, C.-L., 1989. Regression and time series model selection in small samples. Biometrika
76 (2), 297–307.
Jiang, C., 2012. Does tail dependence make a difference in the estimation of systemic risk? Tech. rep.,
CoVaR and MES Working Paper, Boston College.
Joe, H., Xu, J. J., 1996. The estimation method of inference functions for margins for multivariate models.
Tech. rep., Department of Statistics, University of British Columbia.
Kok, C., Gross, M., Aug. 2013. Measuring contagion potential among sovereigns and banks using a mixed-
cross-section GVAR. Working Paper Series 1570, European Central Bank.
Kupiec, P., 1995. Techniques for verifying the accuracy of risk measurement models. The Journal of Deriva-
tives 3 (2), 73–84.
MacKinnon, J. G., 2009. Bootstrap hypothesis testing. Handbook of Computational Econometrics 183, 213.
Mainik, G., Schaanning, E., 2014. On dependence consistency of CoVaR and some other systemic risk
measures. Statistics and Risk Modeling 31 (1), 49–77.
Panetta, F., Correa, R., Davies, M., Di Cesare, A., Marques, J.-M., Nadal de Simone, F., Signoretti, F.,
Vespro, C., Vildo, S., Wieland, M., Apr. 2011. The impact of sovereign credit risk on bank funding
conditions. MPRA Paper 32581, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Patton, A., 2013. Chapter 16 - copula methods for forecasting multivariate time series. In: Elliott, G., Tim-
mermann, A. (Eds.), Handbook of Economic Forecasting. Vol. 2 of Handbook of Economic Forecasting.
Elsevier, pp. 899 – 960.
Patton, A. J., 2006. Modelling asymmetric exchange rate dependence. International Economic Review 47 (2),
527–556.
Reboredo, J., Ugolini, A., 2015a. Systemic risk in European sovereign debt markets: A CoVaR-copula
approach. Journal of International Money and Finance 51 (C), 214–244.
Reboredo, J., Ugolini, A., 2015b. A vine-copula conditional Value-at-Risk approach to systemic sovereign
debt risk for the financial sector. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 32, 98–123.
Reboredo, J. C., Ugolini, A., 2016. Systemic risk of Spanish listed banks: a vine copula CoVaR approach.
Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting 45 (1), 1–31.
Rodr´ıguez, J., 2007. Measuring financial contagion: A Copula approach. Journal of Empirical Finance 14 (3),
401–423.
Rodr´ıguez-Moreno, M., Pen˜a, J. I., 2013. Systemic risk measures: The simpler the better? Journal of
Banking & Finance 37 (6), 1817–1831.
Zhang, J., 2015. Systemic Risk Measure: CoVaR and Copula. Ph.D. thesis, Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin.
Appendix A. Backtesting procedure on CoVaR
The proportion of exceedances over the threshold of the CoVaR should equal approximately the
significance level and they should take place independently, not in clusters. Consequently to check
the accuracy of the proposed model we can use the statistical tests for unconditional coverage from
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Kupiec (1995) and the conditional coverage from Christoffersen (1998). The null hypothesis of
the unconditional and conditional coverage is performed at 5% level of significance under skewed-t
margins and the best fit according to the corrected Akaike Information Criterion (AICC).
For the conditioned institution in CoV aRy|x(α, β) I build the indicator function that takes the
value one if past ex-post losses of x cross the ex-ante VaR forecast and zero otherwise, i.e.,
1x,t =
{
1 if rx,t ≤ V aRx,t(α)
0 if rx,t > V aRx,t(α)
.
For those days t where 1x,t = 1 I use a second indicator function that values one if past ex-post
losses of y cross the ex-ante CoV aR forecast and zero otherwise, i.e.,
1j|l,t =
{
1 if ry,t ≤ CoV aRy,t(α, β)
0 if ry,t > CoV aRy,t(α, β)
.
For this last hit sequence I have T1x,t=1 observations , i.e., the observations where rx,t ≤ V aRx,t.Consequently,
to build the backtesting procedure I only employ T1x,t=1 observations and not all the sample as in
the backtesting procedure on V aR.
Unconditional coverage test from Kupiec (1995). The proportion of exceedances
over the threshold is equal to the significance level if CoV aRy|x(α, β) satisfies the unconditional
coverage property, i.e. P (1y|x,t+1 = 1) = β. Consequently the null and alternative hypothesis in
this test would be {
H0 : E[1y|x,t] ≡ p = β,
H1 : E[1y|x,t] ≡ p 6= β.
Let us define X =
∑T1x,t=1
t=1 1y|x,t, then the likelihood ratio of Kupiec (1995) is given by
LR =
pX(1− p)T1x,t=1−X(
T1x,t=1−X
T1x,t=1
)T1x,t=1−X ( X
T1x,t=1
)X ,
where −2 log(LR) ∼ χ21 under the null hypothesis.
Conditional coverage test from Christoffersen (1998). The expected proportion
of exceedances over the threshold at t+ 1 is independent to the proportion of exceedances at t to
satisfy the conditional coverage property, Pt(1y|x,t+1 = 1) = β. Given the assumption that 1x|l,t
follows a first-order Markov sequence with transition probability matrix
P1 =
[
1− p01 p01
1− p11 p11
]
,
where pk,q indicate the probability of having in t+1 1y|x,t+1 = q conditional to the scenario on t
where 1y|x,t = k with q, k = 0, 1. The probability of a exception in t+1 doesn’t depend on the fact
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of having an exception on t if the conditional coverage property is satisfied, i.e. Pt(1y|x,t+1 = 1) =
P (1y|x,t+1 = 1). In conclusion, the null and the alternative hypothesis are{
H0 : E[1y|x,t] ≡ p = p01 = p11,
H1 : E[1y|x,t] ≡ p 6= p01 = p11,
Given the fact that there are T1x,t=1 observations, a total of T
pair
1x,t=1
≡ T1x,t=1−1 pair of observations
can be obtained. The sample of pair of observations can be divided in four subsamples, i.e.
T pair1x,t=1 = T
pair,00
1x,t=1
+ T pair,011x,t=1 + T
pair,10
1x,t=1
+ T pair,111x,t=1 ,
where the superscripts indicate that if there was an exceedance at periods t and t − 1 and the
subscript indicate that all the observations hold rx,t+1 ≤ V aRx,t+1.
Defining
pˆ01 =
T pair,011x,t=1
T pair,001x,t=1 + T
pair,01
1x,t=1
,
and
pˆ11 =
T pair,111x,t=1
T pair,101x,t=1 + T
pair,11
1x,t=1
,
H0 holds if pˆ01 ≈ pˆ11, as a consequence the probability of having an exceedance in t+ 1 could be
defined without taking into account the scenario in t, i.e.,
pˆ =
T pair,011x,t=1 + T
pair,11
1x,t=1
T pair,001x,t=1 + T
pair,01
1x,t=1
+ T pair,101x,t=1 + T
pair,11
1x,t=1
.
The likelihood ratio of Christoffersen (1998) is employed, i.e.
LR =
(
pˆ
pˆ01
)T pair,011x,t=1 ( pˆ
pˆ11
)T pair,111x,t=1
(
1− pˆ
1− pˆ01
)T pair,001x,t=1 ( 1− pˆ
1− pˆ11
)T pair,101x,t=1
,
where −2 log(LR) ∼ χ21. The frequency with which consecutive exceedances are observed may be
few due to the fact that they are rare events, as a consequence the power of this test is limited.
Appendix B. Bootstrap tests
In this section I briefly present the steps followed to build the boostrap tests. The main
reason to build boostrap tests in estimated measures is due to the introduction of a nuisance
parameter in the sample distribution. We estimate the model parameters to build the systemic
measure and because of that, the distribution under the null hypothesis may be different, affecting
to the confidence interval and the p-values. Durbin, J. (1973) points out the effect of estimated
parameters in Kolgomorov Smirnov test. Abadie (2002) employs a boostrap procedure to build a
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Kolgomorov Smirnov test when there are estimated parameters and Bernal et al. (2014) employs
it in the CoV aR framework. I extend the boostrap tests on CoV aR framework to test a change
in the mean.
The standard parametric t test assumes normality and homocedasticity in the sample distribution.
In a boostrap procedure it is not necessary to make any assumption about the sample distribution,
beyond the independence of the observations, because we do not use a theoretical probability
distribution but the sample distribution under the null hypothesis. The following subsections show
the steps in order to obtain the boostrap p-values.
Appendix B.1. Boostrap t test
Given two samples x and y with size nx and ny:
Step 1 : Substract the mean for each sample and add the joint mean, i.e., x˜ = x − x¯ + z¯ and
y˜ = y − y¯ + z¯ where x¯ is the mean of the sample x, y¯ is the mean of the sample y and z¯ is
the mean of z = [x; y].
Step 2 : Resample nx observations for x˜ and ny observations for y˜ obtaining two vector columns x
b
and yb.
Step 3 : Asses t statistic
tb =
x¯b − y¯b√
σ2
xb
nx
+ σ2
yb
ny
where x¯b is the mean of
Step 4 Repeat steps Step 2 - Step 3 B times.
Step 5 Compare t statistic from the original data, i.e., toriginal, with the t statistic from the simulated
data, i.e. tb for b = 1, ..., B. Depending on the alternative hypothesis this last step is different
(MacKinnon (2009)).
(A) H1 : µx 6= µy
pvalue = 2 min
(∑B
b=1 1tb>toriginal + 1
B + 1
,
∑B
b=1 1tb<toriginal + 1
B + 1
)
(B) H1 : µx > µy
pvalue =
∑B
b=1 1tb>toriginal + 1
B + 1
(C) H1 : µx < µy
pvalue =
∑B
b=1 1tb<toriginal + 1
B + 1
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Appendix B.2. Boostrap Kolgomorov Smirnov test
These steps are obtained following Abadie (2002). Given two samples x and y with size nx and
ny:
Step 1 : Resample N = nx + ny observations for z = [x; y] obtaining a vector column z
b.
Step 2 : The first nx rows of column z
b would be xb and the following ny would be y
b.
Step 3 : Assess KSoriginal statistic or the modified version depending if your alternative hypothesis
is Fx(z) 6= Fy(z), i.e. not equal distribution, or Fx(z) < Fy(z), i.e., first order stochastic
dominance of x over y.
Step 4 Repeat steps Step 1 - Step 3 B times.
Step 5 : Assess KSb statistic or the modified version for the original data
Step 6 : pvalues are obtained as:
pvalue =
1 +
∑B
b=1 1KSb>KSoriginal
B + 1
For the test where the alternative hypothesis is H1 : Fx(z) 6= Fy(z), the KS statistic is
KS =
(
nxny
nx + ny
)1/2
supz∈R
∣∣Fx,nx(z)− Fy,ny(z)∣∣
and when the alternative hypothesis is H1 : Fx(z) < Fy(z), i.e., dominance of x over y,
KS =
(
nxny
nx + ny
)1/2
supz∈R
(
Fx,nx(z)− Fy,ny(z)
)
.
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Appendix C. Figures
Figure C.1: CDS spread and price following Berndt and Obreja (2010)
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CDS spread in basic points
The green line represents CDS quotes. The blue line represents the price of an asset built using the exponential function of
the returns from formula (11).
Both trends react with an opposite sign. The price seems to have a smoother path than the CDS quote. The value of time
series is established in the initial date of the sample at 100. The vertical black line represents the week of July 26th, 2012,
when Mario Draghi made the speech that changed the trend of the CDS quote for Spain and Italy.
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Figure C.2: Time-varying evolution of the copula parameter
Time-varying estimated parameter for the best copula fit
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Time-varying evolution of the copula parameter for the best copula fit according to AICC.
AUT: Austria. BEL : Belgium. FRAN: France. DEU: Germany. ITA: Italy. NDL: Netherlands.
ESP: Spain. F. European financial sector.
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Figure C.3: Weekly sovereign CDS returns and risk measures
Returns and risk measures for the sovereign sector
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Time series plots for weekly sovereign CDS returns for the period 2009-2016 (in blue). Risk measures such as Value-at-Risk
with a significance level of 5% (in black), CoV aR for the sovereign sector with the same significance level when the financial
sector is distress (in red) and when there are normal times for the financial sector (in magenta).
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Figure C.4: Weekly CDS returns from financial sector and risk measures
Returns and risk measures for the financial sector
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Time series plots for weekly CDS returns from financial sector for the period 2009-2016 (in blue). Risk measures such as
Value-at-Risk with a significance level of 5% (in black), CoV aR for the financial sector with the same significance level when
the sovereign sector s is distress (in red) and when there are normal times for the sovereign sector s (in magenta).
23
Figure C.5: Time-varying evolution of the contagion measures from the financial sector to the sovereign
sector
Delta conditional measures from the financial sector to the sovereign sector
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Delta conditional measures from the financial sector to the sovereign sector (∆CoV aRs|f (β = 0.05) and ∆CoESs|f (β = 0.05)
) show the evolution of contagion from the financial sector to each European country. Distress periods (grey areas) are
obtained from a Switching Markov model.
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Figure C.6: Time-varying evolution of the contagion measures from the sovereign sector to the financial
sector
Delta conditional measures from the sovereign sector to the financial sector
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Delta conditional measures from the sovereign sector to the financial sector (∆CoV aRf |s(β = 0.05) and
∆CoESf |s(β = 0.05)) show the evolution of contagion from each country to the European financial sector. Distress periods
(grey areas) are obtained from a Switching Markov model.
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Table D.1: Main tail dependence features for each copula
Family Lower tail dependence Upper tail dependence
Clayton 2−1/θt −
Gumbel − 2− 21/θt
Frank − −
BB7 (Joe-Clayton) 2−1/δt 2− 21/θt
Survival Gumbel 2− 21/θt −
Student t 2tη+1
(
−
√
(η+1)(1−θt)
1+θt
)
2tη+1
(
−
√
(η+1)(1−θt)
1+θt
)
BB1 (Clayton-Gumbel) 2−1/θtδt 2− 21/δt
Gaussian − −
Note: − represents that there is no tail dependency.
θt and δt are parameters of the copula at time t. The number of degrees of
freedom of the Student t copula is η.
Source: (Ao et al., 2017, p. 22) and Jiang (2012).
Table D.2: Time-varying parameter representation for each copula
General model Λ
(
ωK + βKθ
K
t−1 + αK
1
20
∑20
k=1 |us,t−k − uf,t−k|
)
Copula Parameter θ Function Λ(x)
Clayton θ exp(x)
Gumbel θ (exp(x) + 1)
Frank θ x
BB7 τL; τU (1 + exp(−x))−1
Survival Gumbel θ (exp(x) + 1)
Student t ρ
1−exp(−x)
1+exp(−x)
BB1 τU : τL (1 + exp(−x))−1
Gaussian ρ
1−exp(−x)
1+exp(−x)
Note:
τU , τL ∈ (0, 1).
For the BB7 copula θ = 1
log2(2−τU )
and δ = −1
log2(τ
L)
.
For the BB1 copula δ = 1
log2(2−τU )
and θ =
− log2(2−τU )
log2(τ
L)
.
The general model for elliptical copulas is:
Λ
(
ωK + βKθ
K
t−1 + αK
1
20
∑20
k=1 Φ
−1(us,t−k)Φ−1(uf,t−k)
)
where Φ−1
is the inverse Gaussian cumulative distribution function or the inverse
Student t cumulative distribution function with η degrees of freedom.
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Table D.3: European banks employed for building the financial system credit risk index
Name Country
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy
Banco Comercial Portugueˆs Portugal
Banco Popular Espan˜ol Spain
Banco Santander Spain
Bayerische Landesbk Germany
BBVA Spain
BNP Paribas France
Commerzbank AG Germany
Cooptieve Cente Rabo BA Netherland
Credit Agricole France
Credit Lyonnais France
Danske Bank A/S Finland
Deutsche bank AG Germany
Erste Group Bank AG Austria
ING Bank N.V. Netherland
Intesa Sanpaolo Spa Italy
KBCA Bank Belgium
Lb Badenwuerttemberg Germany
Mediobanca Spa Italy
Natixis France
Portigon AG Germany
SNS Bank N.V. Netherland
Societe´ Ge´ne´rale France
Unicredit Italy
Unicredit Bank AG Austria
Table D.4: Weights for building the financial sector proxy.
Countries 1st PCA (%)
Austria 10.83
Belgium 8.02
Finland 9.95
France 12.73
Germany 11.73
Italy 11.95
Netherland 12.62
Portugal 9.64
Spain 12.53
1st PCA column expresses the
weights obtained by the first
principal component.
Equal indicates the equally
weighted portfolio.
Table D.5: Descriptive statistics: CDS returns.
Financial sector Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain
Mean 0.0007 0.0026 0.0020 0.0010 0.0022 0.0012 0.0020 0.0014
Maximum 0.0818 0.1907 0.1102 0.1441 0.1482 0.1298 0.1398 0.1347
Minimum -0.0866 -0.1081 -0.1162 -0.1008 -0.1151 -0.1292 -0.0998 -0.0826
Std. Dev. 0.0292 0.0310 0.0302 0.0324 0.0337 0.0338 0.0300 0.0317
Skewness -0.1031 0.4788 -0.1247 0.3387 0.2664 0.1037 0.3422 0.2529
Kurtosis 3.2177 7.7882 5.3097 5.8765 5.1924 4.5488 5.8348 4.1274
Weekly data for the period May 22th, 2009 to May 13th, 2016. Returns obtained following Equation (11).
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Table D.6: Estimates for the marginal distribution models.
Financial
sector
Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain
φ0 0.0007 0.0013 0.0019 0.0021 0.0017 0.0018 0.0009 0.0013
(0.44) (1.05) (1.42) (1.39) (1.12) (1.05) (0.88) (0.77)
φ1 0.2542 0.2468 0.2418 0.2253 0.2603 0.2230 0.3035 0.2073
(4.80) (4.27) (4.14) (3.76) (4.61) (4.18) (19.27) (3.89)
φ2 - - - - - -0.1515 - -0.1443
(-2.91) (-2.68)
ω 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(2.21) (0.66) (1.33) (1.14) (0.47) (0.57) (1.56) (1.02)
α 0.0000 0.2513 0.3164 0.2298 0.1208 0.0404 0.2297 0.0001
(0.00) (2.38) (1.93) (1.83) (1.03) (1.07) (4.23) (0.00)
β 0.8974 0.7486 0.6342 0.7070 0.8577 0.9134 0.6996 0.8980
(70.62) (7.57) (4.43) (4.75) (8.60) (11.36) (12.92) (11.42)
θ 0.0956 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0430 0.0552 0.1414 0.1073
(1.79) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.62) (6.25) (1.33)
λ -0.0962 0.0367 -0.0037 0.0111 0.0283 -0.0169 0.0274 -0.0750
(-1.22) (0.58) (-0.06) (0.14) (0.40) (-0.23) (1.05) (-0.95)
η 27.9570 4.6061 3.8584 4.5905 3.9826 4.7036 3.2816 7.0903
(0.77) (3.58) (3.81) (3.28) (4.78) (3.67) (73.02) (15.07)
LogLike 736.398 745.540 755.618 728.359 707.992 698.789 767.387 705.898
Kupiec (1995) 0.598 0.317 0.830 0.598 0.444 0.144 0.444 0.969
Christoffersen (1998) 0.131 0.760 0.786 0.935 0.111 0.065 0.469 0.177
LB 0.550 0.352 0.824 0.561 0.970 0.882 0.139 0.948
ARCH 0.783 0.340 0.291 0.624 0.839 0.751 0.983 0.451
Notes: The table provides information on maximum likelihood parameter estimates and z-statistics (in brackets) for
the marginal models in Equation (5)-(6). LogLike stands for the log-likelihood value. Kupiec (1995) and Christoffersen
(1998) denote p-values of the unconditional coverage test from Kupiec (1995) and the conditional coverage test from
Christoffersen (1998) with a significance level of 5%. LB and ARCH refer to p-values of the Ljung-Box test for serial
correlation with 20 lags and the Engle’s Lagrange multiplier for ARCH effects in the first lag.
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Table D.7: Copula model estimates for financial and sovereign sectors’ returns for the period 2009-2016. (I)
Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain
C
la
y
to
n
ω -0.33 -0.78 -0.40 -0.41 1.72 1.07 2.59
(0.15) (0.23) (0.32) (0.25) (0.35) (0.92) (1.09)
α -2.18 -1.48 -0.82 -2.03 -6.74 -6.24 -7.43
(0.25) (0.41) (0.19) (0.11) (0.33) (1.07) (0.51)
β 0.70 1.01 0.61 0.76 -0.08 0.00 -0.54
(0.22) (0.29) (0.19) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
G
u
m
b
el
ω 1.95 -2.27 -1.99 -2.82 -0.60 -0.01 0.53
(0.35) (0.13) (0.67) (2.69) (0.13) (0.79) (0.13)
α -9.39 -3.12 -0.78 -1.62 -2.04 2.13 -4.45
(0.46) (0.08) (0.53) (1.92) (0.16) (0.70) (0.50)
β -0.48 1.39 1.05 1.60 0.49 -1.00 0.13
(0.25) (0.07) (0.38) (1.51) (0.18) (0.32) (0.45)
F
ra
n
k
ω 1.24 0.41 -0.28 0.36 1.96 3.95 8.95
(0.35) (0.33) (0.01) (20.13) (0.06) (1.06) (0.35)
α -2.93 -1.10 1.01 -0.99 -3.55 4.79 -14.41
(0.09) (0.32) (0.02) (17.61) (0.18) (2.08) (0.15)
β 0.84 0.95 1.02 0.96 0.80 -0.51 -0.04
(0.08) (0.28) (0.00) (9.58) (0.06) (0.46) (0.46)
B
B
7
ωL 2.95 4.95 -1.69 5.81 -2.16 2.28 -2.02
(0.06) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.11) (1.87) (0.06)
αL -12.06 -20.30 -1.04 -24.28 0.59 -13.31 0.48
(0.01) (0.05) (0.14) (0.01) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09)
βL -2.59 -3.95 3.77 -4.07 4.14 -0.19 3.90
(0.01) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.00) (1.29) (0.02)
ωU 0.77 1.78 0.60 2.74 -0.78 -3.20 2.66
(0.08) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.12) (1.44) (0.18)
αU -9.77 -13.89 -0.30 -12.79 -3.37 4.16 -16.17
(0.08) (0.07) (0.21) (0.01) (0.10) (0.46) (0.02)
βU 1.13 -1.68 -2.12 -5.81 2.78 4.04 0.41
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.1) (1.18) (0.00)
Notes: The table provides information on maximum likelihood parameter estimates and
standard deviation (in brackets) for the copula models in Equations (8), (9) and (10).
Standard deviation of copula parameters has been computed following the sandwich form
presented in Patton (2013).
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Table D.8: Copula model estimates for financial and sovereign sectors’ returns for the period 2009-2016.
(II)
Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain
S
u
rv
iv
a
l
G
u
m
b
el
ω -2.23 -0.70 -2.05 -2.28 0.60 -0.31 2.96
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02)
α -1.57 -5.12 -0.58 -2.26 -4.75 -3.33 -7.27
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.44) (0.01) (0.03)
β 1.24 0.63 1.07 1.35 0.13 0.15 -0.80
(0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (1.07) (0.02) (0.03)
S
tu
d
en
t
t
η 9.46 19.69 4.16 10.73 99.67 41.62 11.33
(0.21) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00)
ω 1.42 1.39 -0.53 2.27 1.25 1.35 1.93
(0.31) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06)
α 0.64 -2.04 -0.37 -4.36 8.79 -0.98 3.55
(0.24) (0.23) (0.03) (0.01) (0.19) (0.02) (0.02)
β -0.98 1.08 3.47 1.73 -4.31 0.34 -2.27
(0.10) (0.12) (0.02) (0.01) (0.16) (0.00) (0.02)
B
B
1
ωL 2.35 6.36 -1.77 -1.12 0.66 2.74 1.80
(0.12) (0.2) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
αL -10.90 -28.76 -0.96 -3.64 -6.83 -16.46 -4.95
(0.12) (0.20) (0.01) (0.03) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
βL -2.90 -4.93 3.88 3.56 0.79 -0.34 -2.33
(0.01) (0.12) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
ωU -0.60 1.10 -0.86 -5.74 -1.96 -3.12 0.35
(0.07) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0 (0.02)
αU -5.27 -7.68 1.77 11.97 0.02 3.79 -5.86
(0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04)
βU 2.36 -8.55 -0.39 4.32 3.92 4.04 1.19
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.00)
G
a
u
ss
ia
n
ω -0.01 -0.05 2.24 0.16 -1.42 0.46 -0.33
(0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
α 0.20 0.13 0.87 0.25 0.11 0.17 0.28
(0.01) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
β 2.08 2.16 -1.90 1.61 4.42 1.03 2.78
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01)
Notes: The table provides information on maximum likelihood parameter estimates and stan-
dard deviation (in brackets) for the copula models in Equations (8), (9) and (10). Standard
deviation of copula parameters has been computed following the sandwich form presented in
Patton (2013).
Table D.9: Value of the Akaike Information Criterion corrected for small sample bias for the considered
copulas.
Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain
AICC
Clayton -106.67 -64.46 -170.21 -88.85 -242.52 -79.10 -216.72
Gumbel -100.29 -47.99 -169.62 -74.43 -279.59 -66.11 -256.65
Frank -107.79 -59.59 -172.07 -84.69 -270.14 -83.53 -231.55
BB7 -113.66 -64.68 -195.68 -94.36 -304.67 -82.87 -282.81
Survival Gumbel -117.45 -65.21 -193.20 -96.62 -288.21 -84.55 -260.46
Student t -111.81 -56.65 -199.06 -95.09 -306.85 -81.44 -268.17
BB1 -115.02 -67.96 -196.52 -99.25 -301.78 -84.74 -273.48
Gaussian -116.39 -68.54 -184.78 -91.99 -307.65 -83.77 -273.13
Notes: AICC denotes Akaike Information Criterion corrected for small sample bias.
AICC = 2k T
T−k−1 − 2 log(Lˆ) where T is the sample size, k is the number of estimated parameters
and Lˆ is the Log-likelihood value. Minimum AICC value (in bold) indicates the best copula fit.
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Table D.10: CoVaR backtesting
Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain
C
o
V
a
R
f
|s
,t
(0
.5
,0
.0
5
)
K
u
p
ie
k
pvalue 0.5635 0.8319 0.4980 0.5635 0.5750 0.3209 0.7244
Lower bound 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Upper bound 14 14 15 14 14 14 13
# exceedances 7 8 7 7 7 6 7
# observations 172 172 178 172 171 174 159
C
h
ri
st
o
ff
er
se
n pvalue 0.4394 0.3754 0.4476 0.4394 0.4380 0.5114 0.4204
T00 157 155 163 157 156 161 144
T01 7 8 7 7 7 6 7
T10 7 8 7 7 7 6 7
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C
o
V
a
R
s
|f
,t
(0
.5
,0
.0
5
)
K
u
p
ie
k
pvalue 0.4095 0.8454 0.1456 0.8755 0.8755 0.8454 0.5750
Lower bound 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Upper bound 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
# exceedances 11 8 13 9 9 8 7
# observations 171 171 171 171 171 171 171
C
h
ri
st
o
ff
er
se
n pvalue 0.2171 0.3740 0.1421 0.3157 0.3157 0.3740 0.4380
T00 148 154 144 152 152 154 156
T01 11 8 13 9 9 8 7
T10 11 8 13 9 9 8 7
T11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kupiec refers to the unconditional coverage test from Kupiec (1995) whereas Christoffersen denotes the
conditional coverage test from Christoffersen (1998).
Backtesting is drawing up employing observations where returns of the conditioning variable are lower than
the minimum return according to V aRx,t(0.5). The number of observations that cross the threshold is showed
in # observations. Given these observations, the backtesting for the conditioned variable is computed using
those returns below the CoV aRy|x,t(0.5, 0.05).
Confidence interval for the null hypothesis is presented in the upper bound and lower bound rows. The
actual number of exceedances is presented in # exceedances.
For the conditional coverage test by Christoffersen (1998) about CoV aR, T00 indicates the number of pairs
of observation where no exceedance occurs neither in t − 1 nor in t, T11 shows the number of pairs of
observation where an exceedance occurs in t−1 and in t, T01 shows the number of pairs of observation where
an exceedance occurs in t but no in t − 1, and T10 indicates the number of pairs of observation where an
exceedance occurs in t− 1 but no in t.
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Table D.11: Boostrap pvalues
Country-
Financial
sector
Measure t1 t2 KS1 KS2
Austria
F → S 0.0276 0.0135 0.0226 0.0099
S → F 0.0104 0.0047 0.1372 0.3018
Belgium
F → S 0.0514 0.0264 0.0018 0.0011
S → F 0.1770 0.0811 0.0002 0.0002
France
F → S 0.0832 0.0358 0.0014 0.0006
S → F 0.1608 0.0796 0.0017 0.0007
Germany
F → S 0.0884 0.0427 0.0354 0.6281
S → F 0.0178 0.0102 0.5345 0.3739
Italy
F → S 0.1202 0.0584 0.0014 0.0008
S → F 0.0352 0.0188 0.0146 0.0081
Netherlands
F → S 0.0160 0.0110 0.0821 0.0377
S → F 0.1022 0.0521 0.0536 0.0626
Spain
F → S 0.0878 0.0451 0.0039 0.0020
S → F 0.0280 0.0138 0.0006 0.0004
F → S stands for the orthogonalized −∆CoV aRs|f,t(0.05)
whereas S → F indicates the orthogonalized −∆CoV aRf |s,t(0.05).
∆CoV aRf |s,t(0.05) is multiplied by minus one in order to speak
about levels of contagion, and due to orthogonalization the ∆CoV aR
is not explained by its previous month. The chosen breakpoint is July
26th, 2012. All p-values are obtained using a boostrap procedure ex-
plained in Appendix B using B = 10000 simulations.
t1 shows the p-vale of t test where the null hypothesis is that the
mean of level of contagion not explained by the previous month is the
same before and after the breakpoint, i.e. H0 : µB = µA and H1 :
µB 6= µA whereas the alternative hypothesis in t2 is H1 : µB > µA.
KS1 shows the p-value of the Kolgomorov Smirnov test where the
null and alternative hypothesis are H0 : FB(z) = FA(z)∀z and H0 :
FB(z) 6= FA(z)∀z where B is the level of contagion not explained by
the previous month before July 26th, 2012 and A is the same variable
after that date.
KS2 indicates the p-value to the Kolgomorov Smirnov test where
the alternative hypothesis is the first-order stochastic dominance of
the distribution of the contagion before the breakpoint over the dis-
tribution of the contagion after the breakpoint, i.e., H1 : FB(z) <
FA(z)∀z. In order words, for any level of contagion z it would be a
more extreme scenario after that before the breakpoint.
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